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OCCURRENCE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS MODEL (OHFAM) 
1. Luo Min         2. Rong Mei        3.Li Jing 
China Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology 
Beijing 100028，China 
In order to enhance the classification, analysis and utilization of safety information, China civil 
aviation develops a more suitable model named “Occurrence Human Factors Analysis 
Model(OHFAM)” ,which based on the “Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” 
(HFACS) and the actual operation conditions and characteristics of China civil aviation. This model 
consists of five layers and especially adds the layer of “Government Supervision” which reflects the 
deficiency of regulatory authorities in Safety Supervision. On the basis of safety information analysis 
and extensive research, OHFAM considers safety culture and operational characteristics of China 
civil aviation, and offers five layers in details from flight, maintenance and air traffic control.  
In this paper, the basic elements and functions of OHFAM are introduced. And then we use this 
model to analyze the incidents of the last five years (2006-2010) of China, and sum up the main 
contributing factors. 
OHFAM’s Origin and Characteristics 
Since 1940, International Aviation indicated 75% of the accidents were due to one or more "human error", and 
then we got the point gradually that “to error is human”, it means that we should not only concern about human error, 
but more in-depth study on the organization and management factors behind the human error. 
The most well-known human factors analysis model proposed by James Reason in 1990 is “Swiss cheese model”. 
According to this model, the failures of all levels interact and lead to disastrous consequences; the failures are the 
"holes” of system at different levels 1)[1]. Based on Swiss cheese model, Wiegmann and Shappell1)[2]1)[3] developed the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System（HFACS），this model helps to define the “holes of cheese model” to 
promote the availability in accident investigation and information analysis.  
 
 
However, the existing human factors analysis model cannot fully meet China's actual needs. On one hand, the 
classification of factors and items in China is slight different, on the other hand, the existing model does not involve the 
top management of civil aviation authorities - the government factors. Therefore, after the combination of HFACS and 
human factors of previous research results 1)[4] , we develop a more suitable model named “Occurrence Human Factors 
Analysis Model (OHFAM)” for China civil aviation human factors analysis. It has five layers including “Unsafe 
Behavior”, “Preconditions for Unsafe Behavior”, “Department Management”, “Organizational Influence” and 
“Government Supervision”. The model clarifies its sub-categories of factors (as shown in Figure 1) and gives various 
items as the expression of each factor. The OHFAM’s checklist gives targeted items to differ from flight, maintenance 
and ATC in “Unsafe Behavior” and “Preconditions for Unsafe Behavior”, expanding the model’s availability. 
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Figure 1 OHFAM Framework 
Unsafe Behavior 
“Unsafe behavior” refers to the frontline operator’ behavior that violates the objective laws of safe operation 
during the work process, and lead to occurrence directly. In OHFAM, “unsafe behavior” can be classified into two 
categories: violations and errors. Violations represent the willful disregard for the rules and regulations that ensure the 
safety of flight. Errors represent the mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their intended 
outcome. It can be classified into three categories: skill-based error, decision-making error and cognitive error.  
 
 
Preconditions for Unsafe Behavior 
“Precondition for unsafe behavior” is the adverse objective and subjective conditions which cause the unsafe 
behavior. In OHFAM, it can be classified into three categories: “environmental factors”, “operator status” and “group 
resource management”. “Environmental factors” refers to the physical and technological environment which reduces 
the operator’s performance or lead to unsafe behavior. “Operator status” is the personal condition which may reduce the 
operator’s performance, including “mental status”, “physiological status”, “physical/mental limitations”, and 
“individual readiness”. Besides, “Group resource management” refers to the poor communication or collaboration 
among the operator and their group which may lead to the occurrence.  
Department Management 
“Department Management” refers to the supervisor at the middle management does not effectively control or 
monitor the status of front-line operators and their operating environment, In OHFAM, it can be classified into four 
categories: “inadequate supervision”, “planned inappropriate operations”, “failed to correct problem” and “supervisory 
violation”.“Inadequate supervision” refers to the middle managers failed to fully perform its regulatory functions. 
“Planned inappropriate operations” refer to the department managers do not consider completely when they make the 
operational plans or the plans are unreasonable. “Failed to correct problem” refers to those instances when the 
deficiencies of individuals, equipments ,trainings or other related safety areas are “known” to the middle manager, yet 
are allowed to continue unabated.“Supervisory violation” refers to those instances when existing rules and regulations 
are willfully disregarded by middle manager.  
Organizational Influence 
“Organization influence” refers to the top management’s inappropriate decision. In OHFAM, it can be classified 
into three categories: “resource management”, “operational process” and “organizational climate”. “Resource 
Management” encompasses the decision of corporate-level regarding the allocation and maintenance of organizational 
assets such as human resources, monetary assets, and equipment and information. “Operational process” refers to the 
processes that govern the daily activities, establish and maintain of standardized operation procedures, and keep 
balances between the workforce and management. It can be reflected from the operation management, procedures, and 
oversight. “Organizational climate” refers to a broad class of organizational variables that influence worker 
performance. It can be reflected from the organization’s structure, policy guidance and organizational culture. 
Government Supervision 
 “Government Supervision” reflects the deficiency of regulatory authorities in safety supervision. In OHFAM, it 
can be classified into four categories: “supervision and monitoring”, “macro regulatory control”, “regulation and 
 
 
standards” and “safety culture”. “Supervision and monitoring” refers to civil aviation regulatory authorities supervise 
and evaluate their enterprises, and expose the related illegal and violation activities. “Macro regulatory control” refers 
to civil aviation regulatory authorities’ plan of infrastructure development and the pace or the direction of industry to 
achieve a goal of a safe, stable and sustainable development. “Regulation and standards” is the rational induction and 
systematic summary of the safety law, working experience and practice of aviation operation. “Safety culture” 
encompasses scientific safety management concept, the right values and the strict criterion. 
The Analysis of Crew Caused Incidents Based On OHFAM 
We use the OHFAM to analyze the 76 crew caused incidents1 of the last five years from 2006 to 2010 in China, 
and determine what kind of the factors and items happened frequent (as shown in Table 1). 
Table1   
Analysis of the Last 5 Years Crew Caused Incidents Based on OHFAM 
Layer( Factors) fn Items  fn 
Unsafe Behavior 
Violation 42 
a) Violate flight operation procedure 
b) Violate ATC instruction 
22 
7 
Error 
Skill-based error 124 
a) Delayed manipulation 
b) Poor attention distribution 
c) Delayed deviation amendment 
13 
13 
12 
Decision-making error 36 
a) Wrong decision of go around 
b) Improper takeoff\ landing decision 
21 
9 
Cognitive error 37 
a) Misjudge distance/altitude/airspeed 
b) Loss of location consciousness 
12 
5 
Precondition for 
Unsafe Behavior 
Environmental factors 99 
a) Wind 
b) Rain\Snow 
c) Poor visibility 
19 
17 
15 
Operator status 122 
a) Unfamiliar with airport 
b) Poor practical experience 
c) Poor theoretical knowledge 
d) Fluke mind 
21 
18 
16 
10 
                                                        
1 Data from the China Civil Aviation Safety Information Reporting Database. 
 
 
e) Fatigue 3 
Group resource management 117 
a) Lack of explicit distribution 
b) Insufficient cross-check 
c) Fail to conduct adequate brief 
d) Lack of proper authority gradient 
18 
13 
12 
9 
Department 
Management 
Inadequate supervision 4 Fail to implement supervision 3 
Planned inappropriate operations 20 Crewmember mismatch 12 
Failed to correct problem 1 Fail to report unsafe information 1 
Organization 
Influence 
Resource management 112 
a) Insufficient CRM training 
b) Lack of theoretical training 
c) Lack of manipulation training 
34 
17 
17 
Operational process 14 
a) Lack of risk management 
b) Lack of supervision 
4 
4 
Organizational climate 17 
a) Poor safety culture 
b) Insufficient group consciousness 
10 
3 
Government 
Supervision 
Regulation and standards 3 Incomplete regulation 3 
Supervision and monitoring 4 Absent supervision 3 
Note： fn is an frequency which is the numbers of this factor or item per 100 crew caused incidents. 
According to the frequency of the factors and items described above, it can be summarized in the following 
significant issues. 
1) Poor flight techniques. Analysis results show that the most common unsafe behavior is skill-based error, which 
mainly reflects on “Delayed manipulation”, “Poor attention distribution” and “Delayed deviation amendment”. These 
errors indicate the pilot’s flight techniques are not proficient.  
2) Lack of teamwork. Analysis results show that the “Group resource management” of “precondition for unsafe 
behavior” is the most important factors contributed to the incidents. It mainly reflects on “Lack of explicit distribution”, 
“Insufficient cross-check” and “Fail to conduct adequate brief”. These errors indicate there are not effective 
 
 
communications between crew members.  
3) Crewmembers mismatch. Result about the group resource management also reflects the crew manning or 
scheduling is inappropriate, especially on the authority gradient. Because most companies have adopted the automatic 
scheduling to arrange the qualified pilots in a short time, but it cannot take into account the pilots’ technical 
characteristics, operating custom, personality characteristics and other factors. The mismatch is always an issue.  
4) Crew fatigue needs more attention. Crew fatigue is one of the significant problems of the past five years. 
Airlines in China faced larger transportation pressure year by year, but were forced to operate at full capacity. In this 
situation, the serious phenomenon is the shortfall of pilots especially the qualified caption, finally resulted in a heavy 
workload and the reduced rest time, and then induced fatigue.  
Conclusion 
Based on the HFACS, this paper establishes the OHFAM considering features of China civil aviation. In summary, 
the model can provide a systematic approach for accident investigation, which is conducive to guide the information 
gathering and information analysis; The model considers the deep factors on the government layer, which is conducive 
to find that the government regulatory problems; The model verify the theory that the accident was caused by the 
interactive multi-level factors, which is conducive to provide the safety recommendations and measures. 
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